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Abstract. Dispute resolution mechanisms are important components
of voting schemes, deterring a voting authority to change the election
outcome as any alteration can be proved by such mechanisms. However,
these mechanisms are useless if not triggered by voters, who should not
have to choose to either raise a dispute or keep their vote private. Hence,
voting schemes should include privacy-preserving dispute resolution.
In this work, we advance the formal analysis in the symbolic model of
an improved version of the Bingo Voting scheme, whose enhancements
include privacy-preserving dispute resolution mechanisms. Most of our
analysis of several verification, dispute resolution, and privacy properties
is done automatically using ProVerif, which we complement with manual
induction proofs as necessary. We find that the scheme meets some prop-
erties only if one makes additional trust assumptions to those stated in
[6]. For example, we find that dispute resolution is met assuming an hon-
est voting authority. Moreover, our work provides an understanding of
privacy-preserving dispute resolution in general, which can be beneficial
to similar analyses of other voting schemes.
1 Introduction
Consensus on the election outcome and vote privacy are two main pillars of
voting schemes. On the one hand, voting schemes that fail in achieving consensus
are worthless, hence a voting scheme should provide high confidence in the result
of the election despite voters do not necessarily trust the voting authority. On
the other hand, failing to provide vote privacy opens to effective manipulation
of voters and to control the outcome of the election. Intuitively, consensus on
the election outcome and vote privacy seem to be two contrasting properties:
more evidence would increase confidence in the election outcome at the risk of
fewer privacy guarantees. Recent work [12] has shown that vote privacy implies
individual verifiability. However, individual verifiability only enables a voter to
check that her ballot has been counted, but not to publicly prove it. This means
that a dishonest voting authority may still change the election outcome and
there is no public evidence that could prove so.
One can deter a voting authority from changing the election outcome by
introducing dispute resolution mechanisms that enable a voter to prove to any
observer that her vote was not included in the tally. This should be possible
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for the voter without giving up vote privacy, hence dispute resolution should be
privacy-preserving.
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of an improved version of the
Bingo Voting scheme [6,18], which aims at ensuring privacy-preserving dispute
resolution mechanisms among other features. We check automatically several ver-
ification, dispute resolution, and privacy properties in ProVerif, and identify the
additional trust assumptions required by the scheme respect to the ones stated
in [18]. To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first formal treat-
ment of the improved version of Bingo Voting. We provide the precise algorithm
that enables an observer to dispute the outcome of an election and details the
aftermath of a privacy-preserving dispute resolution at the voting phase, consid-
ering different mitigation scenarios. The outcome of our analysis pinpoints the
difficulties in designing privacy-preserving dispute resolution mechanisms and
can be useful for other voting schemes.
Outline. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details the improved Bingo
Voting scheme as well as its properties and trust assumptions. Section 3 presents
the formal analysis of verification, dispute resolution, and privacy properties
in the improved Bingo Voting. Then, it discusses the outcome of the analysis.
Section 4 presents some related work. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background
Bingo Voting was originally proposed by Bohli, Müller-Quade and Röhrich in
2007 [7]. The underlying idea of Bingo Voting is that each voter receipt assigns
to each candidate either a dummy random number or a fresh random number.
The voting authority generates the dummy random numbers before the voting
phase starts. A trusted random generator (TRNG) creates the fresh random
numbers during the voting phase. The voting machine then assigns the fresh
random number to the candidate chosen by the voter and a different dummy
random number to each of the remaining candidates.
In Bohli et al. [6] and later in Henrich [18], several improvements are proposed
to the original Bingo Voting system, including extensions to use Bingo Voting for
more complex elections and ways to address usability limitations. In this paper,
we consider two key improvements, hence we will refer to the resulting system
as the improved Bingo Voting. The first improvement that we consider consists
of two privacy-preserving dispute resolution procedures, one at the voting and
the other at tallying. The other improvement regards the optimisation of the
proof of correct distribution of dummy votes, which in the improved version is
done after the voting phase. Figure 1 presents a message sequence chart of the
scheme. The details of the scheme are outlined below.
Before the voting phase, the voting authority generates and publishes a set
of dummy votes. A dummy vote consists of a pair of Pedersen commitments
that hide both the dummy random number and the assigned candidate. Each
candidate receives the same number of dummy votes, that is, the number of
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Fig. 1. Message sequence chart of the improved Bingo Voting
registered voters. Thus, the total number of generated dummy votes is equal to
the product of the number of voters and the number of candidates.
Inside the voting booth, a display shows the fresh random number generated
by the TRNG. The voter records her choice on a paper ballot and feeds it
into the voting machine, which is equipped with a scanner-based interface. The
voting machine scans the paper ballot and generates a receipt such that the fresh
random number is printed next to the name of the candidate chosen by the voter.
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Unused dummy random numbers, which the voting authority generated before
the voting phase, are instead printed next to any other candidates. The voting
machine also prints an identical barcode onto both paper ballot and receipt, and
keeps the paper ballot inside a special compartment unless the voter decides to
raise a dispute should she receive an incorrect receipt.
(a) Alignment sleeve (b) Encoding sleeve
Fig. 2. The privacy sleeves for the privacy-preserving dispute resolution at voting
In the case of a dispute, the voter can use two different pairs of privacy
sleeves to prove that the printed receipt is incorrect, without revealing the way
she voted. Each pair of privacy sleeves is to be used with both paper ballot and
receipt. The first type of privacy sleeve leaves uncovered candidate names and the
barcodes (see Fig. 2a) and enables a third party to check whether the candidates
are not placed identically in respect to the barcode on the paper ballot and the
receipt. The second type of privacy sleeve leaves uncovered the marking area for
one candidate on the paper ballot and one row of random numbers on the receipt
(see Fig. 2b). This enables a third party to check whether there is a discrepancy
between the voter choice and the receipt as the printed random number differs
from the one displayed on the TRNG.
At tallying, the voting authority publishes the final result of the election
along with the following sets of data on an append-only bulletin board
– A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of correct distribution of dummy
votes showing that each candidate gets the same number of dummy votes.
– A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for each receipt showing that it con-
tains the correct amount of dummy random numbers and that each dummy
random number is assigned to the right candidate.
– The list of all printed receipts.
– The list of opened unused dummy votes, which determines how many votes
each candidate has received.
Since all the receipts are published, every voter can verify whether their
vote is correctly counted. If not, they can raise a privacy-preserving dispute
resolution at tallying proving that their receipt has not been published. Morever,
any observer can check the correctness of the election outcome by verifying that
the tally is indeed the sum of all votes cast.
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Properties. The improved Bingo Voting aims at the following properties:
– Individual verifiability : a voter can check that the receipt encodes her vote.
– Privacy-preserving dispute resolution at voting1: a voter can prove that the
receipt incorrectly encodes her vote, without revealing her vote.
– Privacy-preserving dispute resolution at tallying2: a voter can prove that her
receipt is not in the bulletin board, without revealing her vote.
– Global verification: anyone can prove that the tally is incorrectly computed.
– Vote privacy : No one knows how the voter votes.
– Receipt freeness: The voter has no evidence proving how she voted.
– Coercion resistance: A voter deviating from the intended voting process
receives no evidence that may be used to prove how she voted.
The improved Bingo Voting requires a number of trust assumptions to meet
the security properties outlined above. The most important are that only eligible
voters get access to a voting machine and that each voter casts a single ballot.
Also, it is assumed that voters are unobserved as they cast their ballot, which
is known as the voting booth assumption. Bulletin board (BB) and TRNG are
always considered uncorrupted. For vote privacy, it can be assumed that both
voting authority and the voting machine can be dishonest as soon as they do not
communicate. For receipt freeness and coercion resistance, the voting authority
should be uncorrupted, and the voting machine should not be able to communi-
cate with an attacker. In the next section, we analyse the improved Bingo Voting
in ProVerif to determine any necessary additional assumptions.
3 Formal Analysis
ProVerif [5] allows one to analyse reachability and equivalence-based properties
in the symbolic attacker model. We chose ProVerif mainly because its input
language fits well with our approach in modelling the verification and dispute
resolution mechanisms. It is also one of the few tools that enable the automated
analysis of privacy properties using observational equivalence. The input lan-
guage of ProVerif is the applied π-calculus [1], which the tool automatically
translates to Horn clauses. Cryptographic primitives can be modelled by means
of equational theories. An equational theory E describes the equations that hold
on terms built from the signature. Terms are related by an equivalence relation
= induced by E. For instance, the equation dec(enc(m, pk(k)), k) = m models
an asymmetric encryption scheme. The term m is the message, the term k is the
secret key, the function pk(k) models the public key, the term enc models the
encryption function, and the term dec models the decryption function.
1 In our formal analysis we separate this property into dispute resolution at voting,
which checks the correctness of the test as a reachability property, and vote privacy
after a dispute, which checks vote privacy in terms of observational equivalence.
2 Since all the receipts are eventually published, vote privacy implies that dispute
resolution at tallying is privacy-preserving.
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The equational theory for the improved Bingo Voting is described in Table 1.
It includes the equations for digital signature (in our case checksign returns the
signed message only if one uses the correct verification key, and it fails otherwise),
Pedersen commitment, dummy vote, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
(NIZKP) that prove the correctness of dummy votes and published receipts. To
prove the correctness of the dummy votes, the voting authority uses the function
zkp1 showing that the content of the second commitment of each dummy vote is
equal to the list of the two candidates cA and cB. The function zkp2 allows the
voting authority to prove that the content of a receipt (cA, cB, Rtrg, rX) is iden-
tical to the content of the used dummy vote pair dvp(com(rX, r1), com(cB, cr1))
and to random number displayed on the TRNG (Rtrg), which is hidden into the
fresh dummy vote pair dvp(com(Rtrg, tr), com(cA, cr0)). An auditor can check
both proofs against the dummy vote pairs and the receipts published on the BB.
We specify the processes modelling voting authority, voter, TRNG, and bul-
letin board into a ProVerif library and reuse it to check each property. This
guarantees that all the properties are checked against the same model of the
improved Bingo Voting.
Table 1. Equational theory modelling the improved Bingo Voting
Primitive Equation
Digital
checksign(sign(m, ssk), spk(ssk)) = m
signature
Commitment &
Dummy vote
openCommit(com(val, r)) = (val, r)
openDummyVote(dvp(com0, com1)) = (com0, com1)
NIZKP
dummy vote
checkzkp1 (cA, cB, dvp(com0A, com(cA, cr0)),
dvp(com0B, com(cB, cr1)),
zkp1(cA, cB, cr0, cr1, com(cA, cr0), com(cB, cr1) = OK
NIZKP receipt
(candidate A)
checkzkp2 (cA, cB,Rtrg, rX, dvp(com(Rtrg, tr), com(cA, cr0)),
dvp(com(rY, r0), com(cA, cr0)), dvp(com(rX, r1), com(cB, cr1)),
zkp2(cA, cB, rX, dvp(com(Rtrg, tr), com(cA, cr0)),
dvp(com(rX, r1), com(cB, cr1)),
cr1, cr0, r1, tr)) = OK
NIZKP receipt
(candidate B)
checkzkp2 (cA, cB, rY,Rtrg, dvp(com(Rtrg, tr), com(cB, cr1)),
dvp(com(rY, r1), com(cA, cr0)), dvp(com(rX, r1), com(cB, cr1)),
zkp2 (cA, cB, rX, dvp(com(Rtrg, tr), com(cB, cr1)),
dvp(com(rY, r1), com(cA, cr0)),
cr0, cr1, r1, tr)) = OK
3.1 Verification and Dispute Resolution
All the verification and dispute resolution properties of the improved Bingo
Voting can be modelled as reachability properties. In line with the verification
approach defined in [8,24], we identify the tests that decide whether a goal of
the improved Bingo Voting fails. We then check that each of the tests meets
soundness, completeness, and sufficiency conditions, as outlined in Table 2.
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Table 2. A(·): external attacker; A(VA): attacker controlling the voting authority; V :
voter instances; Vtest : voter instance running the test; τ : a trace representing a run of
the improved Bingo Voting; T : the set of all traces. BB and TRNG are always honest
according to the improved Bingo Voting assumptions.
Strategy Condition
Individual Dispute Global
verification resolution verification
(Soundness) A(·) A(V ) A(V ) ∀τ ∈ T | goal holds in τ =⇒ test(τ) : true
(Completeness) A(VA,V \ Vtest ) A(VA,V \ Vtest ) A(VA,V ) ∀τ ∈ T | test(τ) : true =⇒ goal holds in τ
(Sufficiency) A(VA,V \ Vtest ) A(VA,V \ Vtest ) A(VA,V ) ∃τ ∈ T | test(τ) : false
Soundness guarantees that if the goal holds, then the test always succeeds.
For dispute resolution and global verification, it means that an honest voting
authority should never be blamed by any test. Note that individual verification
requires a different verification strategy than dispute resolution, as the former
considers no inside attacker since the verification is based on (the honest) voter’s
knowledge of the way she voted. In fact, individual verification does not give
the voter a way to prove that the voting authority misbehaved. Conversely, in
case of dispute resolution or global verification, in which tests are decided upon
public information, we consider no honest voters, who may try to feed the tests
with incorrect information. We prove that an honest voting authority cannot be
unfairly blamed.
Completeness guarantees that whenever a test does not blame the voting
authority, then the goal holds. Note that this is logically equivalent to saying that
whenever a goal does not hold, then the test blames the voting authority. Thus,
we check that a dishonest voting authority cannot feed the tests with incorrect
information so that the test succeeds but the goal fails. The verification strategy
for completenessregarding global verification is different from the one regarding
individual verification and dispute resolution: in principle, global verification
should hold even if all voters are dishonest as any election observer can run
the test. However, as we shall see later, global verification can provide only
guarantees up to dishonest voters.
While soundnessand completenessare conforming to [8], we introduce a third
condition, sufficiency, which formalises that the misbehaviour of selected parties
alone is sufficient to make the test fail. Without this condition, a protocol that
does not permit any violation might still fulfil criteria to blame a party [23].
The conditions described in Table 2 show that the main difference between
individual verification and dispute resolution boils down to be the verification
strategy for checking soundness. Thus, a protocol that is dispute free for a specific
goal is also individually verifiable for that goal. This is the case for individual
verification and dispute resolution at voting for the improved Bingo Voting.
Due to space limitations, we only discuss the details of the dispute arising due
to the global verification test in the improved Bingo Voting. The ProVerif code
for all properties is available in [16]. Global verification enables any observers,
including those who have not participated in the election at all, to verify the cor-
74 R. Giustolisi and A. Bruni
rectness of the election outcome. Global verification ensures that all candidates
have received the same number of dummy votes and that for each receipt all but
one candidate lose one dummy vote. This is the most complex test in improved
Bingo Voting and requires the voting authority to release some information. The
original paper presenting the improved Bingo Voting does not detail a specific
algorithm for the test, thus we propose the test as defined in Algorithm 1. Our
test considers two candidates, cA and cB. The input data of the test is published
by the voting authority on the bulletin board.
We can define the goal for global verification goalgv as follows. Let us consider
the set of all voters V of type V, the set of voters’ choices C of type C, the set
of candidates K of type K, the set of honest voters Vh ⊆ V , and the set of
choices of honest voters Ch ⊆ C. Let us now consider the relation Choice as the
votes accepted by the bulletin board according to the published receipts, linking
voters to their choices such that Choice ⊆ V ×C. Similarly, consider the relation
Choice h that links honest voters to their choices such that Choiceh ⊆ Vh ×Ch.
Let Count: (V × C)→ (K × N) be an ideal counting function that returns the
number of votes for each candidate. We can say that the goalgv holds in τ if
Choiceh ⊆ Choice and the election result is equal to Count(Choice).
All our proofs consider an unbounded number of voters. While ProVerif can
automatically prove sufficiency for global verification, it is not possible to prove
soundnessand completenesssince, according to Algorithm 1, we need to iterate
over all receipts, but ProVerif does not support loops. We thus prove the base
case in ProVerif, in which we consider only one published receipt. Then, we
provide a manual induction proof that generalises the ProVerif results to the
general case with an arbitrary number of published receipts.
ProVerif proves soundnessand completenesswhen only one published receipt
is considered. To prove the general case that considers an unbounded number of
published receipt, it is necessary to show that
test(τ) : true ⇔ Choiceh ⊆ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to
Count(Choice)
It can be assumed that the number of published receipts is equal to the
number of the published dummy votes and of the opened dummies. Any observer
can check that these numbers coincide by looking at the bulleting board.
Theorem 1. Let testk(·) be the test applied to an execution that considers k
receipts; let testk(·) →∗ true denote the test that outputs true after some steps;
let τ be a trace that has n receipts; let τj be a version of τ that only considers
the jth receipt that is associated with a honest voter ij and corresponding choice
cj. For soundness, we prove that
∀1  i  n : test1(τj) →∗ true ⇒ (ij , cj) ∈ Choice ∧ the election results is
equal to Count(Choice)
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For completeness, we prove that
∀1  i  n : (ij , cj) ∈ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to
Count(Choice) ⇒ test1(τj) →∗ true
Proof. testn(τ) checks all the receipts, dummy votes, and proofs published in the
bulletin board as defined in Algorithm 1. Similarly, the test ∀1  j  n : test1 (τj)
does the same check for the jth entry in the bulletin board. It follows that
testn(τ) →∗ true
⇓
∀1  j  n : test1 (τj) →∗ true
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1  j  n : (ij , cj) ∈ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to Count(Choice)
⇓
Choiceh ⊆ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to Count(Choice)
which proves soundnessalso for the general case.
Choiceh ⊆ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to Count(Choice)
⇓
∀1  j  n : (ij , cj) ∈ Choice ∧ the election results is equal to Count(Choice)
⇓(by ProV erif)
∀1  j  n : test1 (τj) →∗ true
⇓
testn(τ) →∗ true
which proves completeness also for the general case.
3.2 Privacy
Like in the verification of the verifiability and dispute resolution properties, we
prove privacy by encoding the protocol into one ProVerif library – with a few
modifications compared to the previous one – and then check privacy of different
setups. The main practical change required for proving privacy is to remove the
channel that voter, voting authority, and bulletin board use to feed the test
with the evidence, and let the attacker read all public data and impersonate
misbehaving parties, including an unbounded number of dishonest voters. As
the improved Bingo Voting requires that voters are unobserved as they cast
their vote, all communications between honest voters, the voting machine, and
the TRNG are done over private channels.
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In the privacy setting, we observe two voters in particular, hence the bulletin
board needs to shuffle the votes specifically to avoid trivial attacks to privacy.
We check vote privacy, receipt freeness, and coercion resistance considering an
honest voting authority. We also check vote privacy, and vote privacy of disputed
receipt at the voting phase consider a dishonest voting authority. First, we check
whether vote privacy holds in the improved Bingo Voting. Specifically, we check
that if two honest voters swap their votes in two different runs of the protocol
then the attacker cannot distinguish the two resulting systems as in [22]:
S[VA{a/v} | VB{b/v}] ≈l S[VA{b/v} | VB{a/v}]
Similarly, we check whether vote privacy holds after a dispute at the voting
phase. We let the honest voters reveal the fresh random number obtained by
the trusted random number generator and the dummy random number on the
receipt that is revealed by the privacy sleeve.
To check receipt freeness, we additionally let the voters publish their receipts
on the public channel, and verify that privacy still holds:
S[VA{a/v} | VB{b/v}] ≈l S[V ′ | VB{a/v}]
where V ′ is a process such that V ′\out(chc,·) ≈l VA{b/v}, i.e. V ′ is the process
that acts like VA voting for candidate B, but pretends to cooperate with the
attacker.
Finally, to check whether the scheme is coercion resistant, we set up the
protocol so that one of the voters receives the instruction on how to vote from
the attacker and then provides the receipt to the attacker. We check that
S[C[VA{?/v}c1,c2 ] | VB{a/v}] ≈l S[C[V ′] | VB{c/v}]
where VA{?/v}ch,a is the coerced voter process that votes for candidate B, no
matter their original intention, reveals all its private information to the attacker
via channels c1, c2, while VB is the other voter process intended to balance the
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resulting votes, that is, if VA votes for candidate A, then VB votes for candidate
B and vice versa. Note that with the setup described here there is a trivial
attack, which only appears in the model, as the bulletin board should not reveal
whether the votes were swapped or not. In practice, this is done by shuffling.
Thus, we let the bulletin board swap the order of published ballots if and only
if the voters actually swap their choice following the attacker’s instruction.
3.3 Findings
ProVerif proves individual verification and both dispute resolution at voting and
at tallying automatically. It also proves global verification for one receipt, then
we provide a manual inductive proof for the unbounded case. The outcome of
our analysis shows that the improved Bingo Voting meets some properties only
if one makes additional assumptions to the ones already defined in [6,18]. The
additional assumptions are reported in Table 3. For dispute resolution at voting,
we need to assume that the test does not blame the voting authority if the
barcode printed on the paper ballot does not match with the one printed on
the receipt. This avoids an attack due to a dishonest voter handing her receipt
to another voter [8]. Without this assumption, the latter, isolated in the voting
booth, may swap the receipt printed by the voting machine with the ones handed
by the dishonest voter, leading to a successful blaming of the voting authority.
We also need to make additional assumptions for proving global verification.
As already noted by in [24], it is only possible to have global verification up to
the votes of dishonest voters since a dishonest voting authority can alter votes
cast by such voters without being detected. Moreover, we found that honest
voters should check that their receipts are well-formed at voting and at tallying,
and raise disputes otherwise.
As regards privacy properties, we found that vote privacy, receipt freeness,
and coercion resistance hold if the voting authority is honest and the voting
machine cannot decide which dummy vote should be assigned to which receipt.
This can be achieved by prearranging dummy votes in clusters [18], which limits
the voting machine’s choice on selecting the dummy votes. Considering two can-
didates, each cluster contains two dummy votes, one per candidate. The voting
authority publishes the clusters in the same order in which the voting machine
uses them for the receipts. The voting authority can prove in zero-knowledge
that each receipt used the dummy votes from the expected cluster. However,
the verification process of the correct order of clusters requires that the bulletin
board publishes the receipts as they are issued. Revealing the order in which the
receipts are issued may not be acceptable for many elections. In fact, ProVerif
finds that if the bulletin board does not randomly shuffle the receipts before pub-
lishing them, the voting authority can easily break vote privacy by just looking
at the order of voters, which is normally available in the voter registration record
at the polling place. Thus, for vote privacy, it is not enough assuming that a dis-
honest voting authority does not communicate with a dishonest voting machine
as suggested in [18]. We need to assume that at least either the voting authority
or the voting machine is honest.
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Table 3. The additional assumptions required in the improved Bingo Voting respect
to the ones stated in [6,18], according to the outcome of our formal analysis
Property Assumptions in [6,18] Additional
assumptions
Individual verification Honest TRNG and BB –
Dispute resolution at
voting
Honest TRNG and BB Do not blame the VA if
barcodes are different
Dispute resolution at
tallying
Honest TRNG and BB –
Global verification Honest TRNG and BB Up to dishonest voters.
Voters check and dispute
incorrect receipts at
voting and at tallying
Vote privacy if dispute at
voting
Honest TRNG and BB.
VA has no access to the
voting machine
Honest VA
Vote privacy Honest TRNG and BB.
VA has no access to the
voting machine
Honest VA or voting
machine
Receipt freeness Honest TRNG, BB,
VA, and voting
machine
–
Coercion resistance Honest TRNG, BB,
VA, and voting
machine
–
ProVerif can prove that vote privacy holds after a dispute if the disputed
receipt is not published on the bulletin board and the dummy vote corresponding
to the dummy random numbers revealed by the privacy sleeve is not opened. In
fact, if the receipt is published, vote privacy does not hold any more because the
random number generated by the TRNG is revealed during the dispute. If the
dummy vote is opened, vote privacy does not hold as well because this would
reveal one of the candidates not chosen by the voter. However, we found that
not revealing the receipt and not opening the dummy vote after a dispute might
break vote privacy.
Privacy Attack Due to Dispute Resolution. Let us consider the scenario with
two candidates in which a voter mistakenly disputes a valid receipt at voting.
This vote should not be counted because the receipt is not published. Also, we
require that a pair of dummy votes that are not in any receipts should not be
opened
– The disputed dummy vote containing the disputed dummy random number
associated with the candidate not chosen by the voter printed on the receipt.
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– A dummy vote associated with the candidate chosen by the voter so that the
disputed receipt is not counted at tallying.
Then, the voting authority should prove in zero-knowledge that the pair of
dummy votes contain the list of the candidates. However, we observe that any
pair of dummy votes containing the list of the candidates can serve for such proof
since the corresponding receipt will not be published. Thus, a dishonest voting
machine can signal a different dummy random number to the voting author-
ity and print the disputed dummy random number again into another receipt,
which will be published on the bulletin board. This would reveal how the disput-
ing voter voted, breaking vote privacy. If one considers a dishonest voter, this
attack is even more harmful. A dishonest voter can dispute a vote on purpose
to learn how another voter voted since the dishonest voter knows the disputed
dummy random number.
Note that the voting machine does not need to communicate with the dis-
honest voter to break vote privacy of another voter, and that this attack works
even considering an honest voting authority. Of course, the attack is not possible
if one considers an honest voting machine but there would not be need of dispute
resolution at all in the first place if one makes such an assumption.
None of the papers presenting the improved Bingo Voting describes what
happens after a dispute. Prearranging dummy votes may mitigate the attack
at the cost of assuming an honest voting authority. Another possible mitigation
to such an attack might be to allow voters who dispute their votes to revote.
Revoting requires to generate additional dummy votes. The total amount of
needed dummy votes should be the double of the original amount in order to
avoid denial of voting attacks. However, this is a partial solution as it would not
mitigate attacks due to dishonest voters.
4 Related Work
Several voting schemes have considered notions of dispute resolution or related
properties. The FOO protocol [14] is one of the first voting schemes that enables
voters to prove certain frauds due to a dishonest voting authority. Pret â
Vòter [27] and vVote [13] provide some dispute resolution and accountability
guarantees as a voter can use invalid proof and a ballot confirmation check as evi-
dence. Remotegrity [31], Scantegrity II [9], and Scantegrity III [29] detail dispute
resolution processes that allow voters to file disputes in case of incorrect desig-
nated ballots or confirmation codes, which are invisible random codes preprinted
on the ballots. sElect [25] features a fully automated verification procedure that
performs cryptographic checks without requiring any voter interaction. The pro-
cedure is capable to single out a specific misbehaving party and producing the
necessary evidence of the misbehaviour. Schoenmarkers [28] and Kiayias and
Yung [20] design dispute-free voting schemes, whose aim is to neutralise faults
rather than providing mechanisms to address them. Some of the above proto-
cols have been formally checked for accountability and/or privacy properties.
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However, no formal analysis has been done to check whether disputes leak any
information regarding how the voter voted.
Prior works on the formalisation of dispute resolution and related proper-
ties, such as accountability, include the seminal work by Küsters et al. [24],
who advance accountability notions in the symbolic and computational models.
Moreover, they provide an analysis of accountability and coercion resistance [26]
of the original Bingo Voting scheme. Bruni et al. [8] propose formal definitions
of accountability that are amenable to automated verification. One of their case
studies is the improved Bingo Voting, which they analyse up to the voting phase,
finding that it does not meet dispute resolution at voting. In contrast, we find
that, if the dispute resolution test does not blame the voting authority when
the barcodes are different between the paper ballot and the receipt, then the
improved Bingo Voting achieves that property. Künneman et al. [23] give veri-
fication conditions that imply accountability based on counterfactual relations,
capturing what actually happened to what could have happened. Basin et al. [2]
proposed a definition of dispute resolution for voting requiring that voters get
evidence that their ballot is incorrectly recorded before the end of the election.
The notions of individual verifiability and universal verifiability have been
extensively studied in voting [3,4,10,11,19]. Kremer et al. [21] formalised both
individual and universal verifiability in the applied pi-calculus, including the
requirement of eligibility verifiability, which expresses that auditors can verify
that each vote in the election result was cast by a registered voter, and there is
at most one vote per voter. Smyth et al. [30] used ProVerif to check verifiability
in three voting protocols expressing the requirements as reachability properties.
Gallegos-Garcia et al. [15] studies how to achieve verifiability without any trust
assumptions. Giustolisi et al. [17] observe that privacy-preserving verifiability can
be achieved using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and functional encryp-
tion techniques. More recently, Cortier and Lallemand [12] have shown that a
voting scheme that does not meet individual verifiability fails to achieve vote
privacy, when one considers the same trust assumptions. This line of work opens
up to interesting questions on how stronger properties such as dispute resolution
and coercion resistance relate.
5 Conclusion
Dispute resolution mechanisms are essential components of a voting scheme,
enabling the correctness of an election outcome. They can provably expose a
misbehaving voting authority, hence deterring it by doing so. However, dispute
resolution is useless if it is not triggered when it should be, and voters should
not have to choose to either raise a dispute or keep their vote private. In this
work, we have looked at the privacy-preserving dispute resolution mechanisms
described in the improved Bingo Voting.
The formal analysis of the improved Bingo Voting allows us to identify pre-
cisely the necessary assumptions that enable the scheme to meet all the stated
properties. It is found that global verification, which enables any observer to
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dispute the correctness on an election, cannot be achieved without dispute reso-
lution both at voting and at tallying. To the best of our knowledge, it is an open
question whether this is just for the improved Bingo Voting or it is a requirement
for any voting scheme.
It is also found that assuming that the voting authority has not illegitimate
access to the voting machine is not enough to guarantee vote privacy: either
the voting authority or the voting machine must be honest at least. However,
it is found that dispute resolution at voting can be achieved only assuming an
honest voting authority as prearranging dummy votes would enable the voting
authority to link votes to voters.
The results of this work also show that designing privacy-preserving dispute
resolution mechanisms with minimal trust assumptions is not a trivial task in
voting. The voting booth assumption should ideally be the sole assumption made
in a voting scheme. Also, the details of the aftermath of a dispute resolution
procedure in voting need to be described and thought with the same precision
and care as are the standard voting procedures. For the improved Bingo Voting,
we observe that, while cancelling an election due to a dispute is not an option,
allowing voters who wrongly contest a receipt to revote mitigates an attack
due to a dishonest voting machine. However, it does not help against a voting
machine colluding with a dishonest voter.
Other voting schemes might achieve privacy-preserving dispute resolution
with fewer assumptions than the improved Bingo Voting. With this work, we
stress the importance of detailing the aftermath of disputes and aim at stimu-
lating the voting community to make similar analyses to other voting schemes.
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11. Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Küsters, R., Müller, J., Truderung, T.: SoK: verifiability
notions for e-voting protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp.
779–798 (2016)
12. Cortier, V., Lallemand, J.: Voting: you can’t have privacy without individual ver-
ifiability. In: CCS, pp. 53–66. ACM (2018)
13. Culnane, C., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S., Teague, V.: vVote: a verifiable voting
system (DRAFT). CoRR abs/1404.6822 (2014)
14. Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large
scale elections. In: Seberry, J., Zheng, Y. (eds.) AUSCRYPT. LNCS, pp. 244–251.
Springer, Heidelberg (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57220-1 66
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